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INTRODUCTION

President Donald Trump’s strict immigration policies display the need
to evaluate the country’s judiciary proceedings on immigration. How exactly
do immigration courts function compared to civil or criminal court
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procedures? In short, the immigration courts are controlled by the executive
branch of the United States government.
This note functions as a call to Congress to develop legislation that
would make the immigration court system into an independent Article I
court. The current system is broken, and it is time for the immigration
courts to become an independent Article I court to eliminate unjust
decisions based on policy rather than the merits of the case. In the past,
Congress has created several Article I courts using its constitutional power
with examples being the tax and bankruptcy courts. 1 Additionally, the
Federal Bar Association has drafted proposed legislation to create an Article
I immigration court because there is a consensus that the current
immigration court system is broken. 2 We have reached the tipping point.
Immigration proceedings should not be determined by the Attorney
General without due process. This note begins by providing the historical
background of immigration adjudication dating back to the Immigration Act
of 1891, when the United States immigration court system was enacted by
* Daniel R. Buteyn, J.D. Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2022; B.A. English,
University of Kansas, 2015. I would like to thank my sister, Cassondre Buteyn, and my
brother-in-law, David Wilson—both successful immigration attorneys and William Mitchell
alumni—for being my mentors and helping me with this fantastic topic selection. I would also
like to thank Professor Steve Aggergaard for his wisdom and guidance throughout the writing
process. Finally, I would like to thank my family—especially my wife, Julia Buteyn—for their
constant love and support throughout my time in law school.
The Federal Judicial Center distinguishes between Article I and Article III judges:
Operating under its Article I, section 8 power to “constitute” federal tribunals,
Congress has created several courts staffed by judges holding these protections
who exercise the “judicial power” contemplated in Article III. These courts are
commonly known as “Article III” or “constitutional” courts. The latter moniker
can be confusing, as the Constitution does not oblige Congress to create any
particular court and such courts routinely hear non-constitutional disputes.
...
Since the earliest days of the republic, Congress has also created separate
“Article I” or “legislative” courts. Again, the nomenclature can be confusing as
Article I does not specifically authorize these courts and they do not “legislate”
in any traditional sense of the word. These courts range from independent
federal tribunals staffed with judges who are not subject to the tenure and salary
protection of Article III . . . Unlike other Article I judges (including bankruptcy,
territorial and magistrate judges), for example, they are not administered by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts or governed by the Judicial
Conference of the United States.
Courts:
A
Brief
Overview,
FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
CENTER,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/courts-brief-overview [https://perma.cc/7DTK-Y68N].
Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION,
http://www.fedbar.org/Advocacy/Issues-Agendas/Article-1-Immigration-Court.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6JXF-59NG].
1

2
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Congress. 3 The relevant history is outlined up to today’s laws, noting any
relevant changes to immigration adjudication. The history provides details
on how the executive branch, specifically the role of the attorney general
gained power.
Section III discusses the differences between federal and state judges
compared to immigration judges. 4 Federal and state judges do not face the
same pressures from the executive branch that immigration judges face. 5
This section also compares the similarities and differences between
immigration trials and criminal and civil trials. 6
Section IV discusses separation of powers and, specifically, how the
executive branch’s control of the immigration courts has created an unfair
shift of power and an imbalance between the branches of the government. 7
To further increase the power of the executive branch, President Trump
recently attempted to strip certain immigration judges of their right to
unionize (or union bust)by targeting judges that do not share his views on
immigration in general and removal proceedings, in particular. 8 This section
moves to the issues involved with former Attorney General Jeff Sessions’
unprecedented and increased use of self-certification to direct the Board of
Immigration Appeal to refer cases to the attorney general for review. 9 This
section will review four specific instances in which former Attorney General
Sessions exercised this power. 10
Section V discusses how this increase of power creates separation of
powers issues among the three branches of the United States government. 11
The power to determine immigration cases oversteps the executive branch’s
bounds by entering into unconstitutional territory. 12
Section VI provides recommendations and a firm call to action for
immigration courts to become Article I courts 13 and therefore, out of the
reach of the President’s influence on immigration judges to rule on cases in
accordance with his policy goals. 14 The final section summarizes that it is
Infra Section II.A. Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/evolution-pre-1983
[https://perma.cc/F6H5-R5YV].
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Section V.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section VI.A.
See infra Section VI.B.
3

4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
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time to put an end to the executive branch turning its back on asylum
seekers. 15
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION

A.

The Immigration Act of 1891

Since President Donald Trump took office on January 20, 2017,
immigration law has increasingly become more of a hot-button issue in the
United States. 16 In order to evaluate the controversy surrounding
immigration issues today, it is helpful to look back at the history of
immigration adjudication. The United States immigration court system
dates back to when Congress enacted the Immigration Act of 1891, 17 which
was the first law that placed immigration under federal control. 18 Prior to the
Immigration Act of 1891, individual states were responsible for enacting and
enforcing their respective immigration laws. 19 Congress passed the Act in an
effort to increase border security and immigration enforcement in the
United States. 20 The Act states, in part:
That the office of superintendent of immigration is hereby created and
established, and the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, is authorized and directed to appoint such officer . . . The
superintendent shall be an officer in the Treasury Department under the
control and supervision of the Secretary of Treasury . . . . 21
By creating the Office of Immigration within the Department of
Treasury, Congress placed enforcement of immigration law directly under
the federal government’s control; however, that was just the beginning. The
Act also gave sole authority and discretion to inspection officers to examine
and remove aliens wanting to enter the United States. 22 This trend of
15
16

See infra Part VII.
Presidents, Vice Presidents, & Coinciding Sessions of Congress, HISTORY, ART &

ARCHIVES
UNITED
STATES
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
https://history.house.gov/Institution/Presidents-Coinciding/Presidents-Coinciding/
[https://perma.cc/RAH3-5XPJ].
Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, supra note 3.
17
18

Id.
Immigration

Act of 1891, IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED
https://immigrationtounitedstates.org/585-immigration-act-of-1891.html
[https://perma.cc/FUN2-W7YQ].
19

20

STATES,

Id.

26 STAT. 1085, 51 CONG. CH. 551 (1891).
The act outlines the inspecting officer’s duty upon any immigrant’s arrival:
That upon the arrival by water at any place within the United States of any alien immigrants
it shall be the duty of the commanding officer and the agents of the steam or sailing vessel by

21
22
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broadening the discretionary powers of inspection officers continues as
immigration adjudication becomes more prevalent today. 23

B.

The Immigration Act of 1893

During the 1890s, wide-spread declining wages and economic
concerns had created discontent among American citizens who blamed the
recent wave of immigrants for the nation’s financial concerns. 24 Just two
years after the Immigration Act of 1891, Congress enacted a new law to
further empower inspection officers. 25 The new Act of 1893 went as far as
to invoke a “duty” on each inspection officer to question and detain “every
person who may not appear to him to be clearly and beyond doubt entitled
to admission.” 26 When an individual was detained for “special inquiry,” four
inspection officers designated by the Secretary of Treasury or the
which they came to report the name, nationality, last residence, and destination of every such
alien, before any of them are landed, to the proper inspection officers, who shall thereupon
go or send competent assistants on board such vessel and there inspect all such aliens, or the
inspection officers may order a temporary removal of such aliens for examination at a
designated time and place, and then and there detain them until a thorough inspection is
made.
Id. (explaining how inspection officers may order removal of individuals and “detain them
until a thorough inspection is made”).
The U.S. Immigration Debate, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-immigration-debate-0
[https://perma.cc/LK7UWELT]. Immigrants account for nearly 14 percent of the current U.S. population, which
equates to around 44 million people. Id.
23

See
Chinese
Exclusion
Act,
HISTORY.COM,
https://www.history.com/topics/immigration/chinese-exclusion-act-1882
[https://perma.cc/8Z8C-28TA]; 27 STAT. 25, 52 CONG. CH. 60 (1892) (restricting
immigration into the United States in an effort to mitigate declining wages).
27 STAT. 569, 52 CONG. CH. 206 (1893).
Section 5 of the Act is quoted in full:
That it shall be the duty of every inspector of arriving alien immigrants to detain
for a special inquiry, under section one of the immigration act of March third,
eighteen hundred and ninety-one, every person who may not appear to him to
be clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission, and all special inquiries shall
be conducted by not less than four officials acting as inspectors, to be designated
in writing by the Secretary of the Treasury or the superintendent of immigration,
for conducting special inquiries; and no immigrant shall be admitted upon
special inquiry except after a favorable decisions made by at least three of said
inspectors; and any decision to admit shall be subject to appeal by any dissenting
inspector to the superintendent of immigration, whose action shall be subject to
review by the Secretary of the Treasury, provided in section eight of said
immigration act of March third, eighteen hundred and ninety-one.
24

25
26
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Superintendent of Immigration would conduct the investigation. 27 In order
for an individual to be successfully admitted to the United States after a
“special inquiry,” they would need the approval of at least three inspecting
officers. 28 Furthermore, any favorable decision to admit an individual would
automatically be subject to an appeal by any dissenting inspection officer to
the Secretary of the Treasury. 29
The Immigration Act of 1893 created additional hurdles for those
immigrating to the United States. Developing a process of “special inquiry,”
where appearances can be the basis of whether or not to detain an individual
or family, is a wholly subjective approach. Immigration officers were given
the power to decide admittance, and if admittance was granted, the
dissenting officer could appeal to the Superintendent of Immigration
“whose action shall be subject to review by the Secretary of Treasury.” 30
Ultimately, the decisions of the immigration officers, the Superintendent,
and the Secretary of Treasury all culminated into a determination on the
subjectivity of immigration decisions.

C.

Significant Changes to Immigration Adjudication up to 1983

Congress enacted significant changes to immigration policies at the
start of the twentieth century. 31 Immigration responsibilities shifted to the
Department of Labor (DOL), and the Immigration Act of 1917 32 codified
and expanded deportation provisions. 33 With the combination of nativist 34
tendencies and the economic concerns following the Industrial Revolution,
Congress looked to further limit access to the United States. 35 Congress
enacted the Immigration Act of 1921, 36 creating the National Origins Quota
27
28
29
30

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

29 STAT. 874, 64 CONG. CH. 29 (1917); 42 STAT. 5, 67 CONG. CH. 8 (1921).
29 STAT. 874, 64 CONG. CH. 29 (1917).
Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, supra note 3.
Nativism is the policy of favoring native inhabitants over immigrants. Nativism, MERRIAMWEBSTER.
Robbie Clark, Note, Reaffirming the Role of the Federal Courts: How the Sixties Provide
Guidance for Immigration Reform, 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 463, 470
(2011).
The act states, in part:
That the number of aliens of any nationality who may be admitted under the
immigration laws to the United States in any fiscal year shall be limited to 3 per
centum of the number of foreign-born persons of such nationality resident in
the United States as determined by the United States census of 1910.
42 STAT. 5, 67 CONG. CH. 8 (1921).
31
32
33
34

35

36
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System which limited the number of immigrants into the United States by
assigning a quota to each nationality. 37 The quota system was designed to
maintain ethnic homogeneity in the United States by limiting the number of
visas awarded to natives of a particular nation—most notably controlling the
number of Asian immigrants. 38 Congress, as a means of rationalizing such
blatant racial discrimination, pointed to the decreased need for cheap labor
sources as a way to severely limit immigration from countries outside of
Northern Europe.. 39 The act temporarily shifted power to the Secretary of
Labor, who created a Board of Review to evaluate appeals and make
recommendations to the Secretary of Labor, although the power would
eventually shift back to the Attorney General. 40
In 1940, immigration matters moved from the DOL to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) where the Attorney General regained decision
powers. 41 The Board of Review was renamed the Board of Immigration
Appeals, and sole responsibility was conferred to the Attorney General. 42
Previously, the Board of Review was able to make recommendations
regarding immigration case appeals, but the newly created Board of
Immigration Appeals was authorized to decide immigration case appeals on
behalf of the Attorney General. 43 Immigrants wanting to appeal their cases
were once again at the mercy of the political goals of the Attorney General
and executive branch.
In 1952, Congress reorganized and modified existing immigrations
laws into one body of text—the Immigration and Nationality Act. 44 They also
Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, supra note 3.
Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C.L. REV. 273, 279–81 (1996).
Clark, supra note 35 at 470–71.
Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, supra note 3.
Id.

37
38

39
40
41

Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and Authority, 5 Fed. Reg. 3,502, 3,503
(Sept. 4, 1940) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 90.1–.2).
The Board of Immigration Appeals has authority:
(a) To issue orders of deportation after proceedings in accordance with law and
regulations; to order the cancellation of warrants of arrest issued in such
proceedings; and in connection therewith to exercise such of the discretion
conferred upon the Attorney General by law as is appropriate to the disposition
of deportation proceedings;
(b) To consider and determine appeals from decisions of boards of special
inquiry in exclusion or pre-examination cases, and to exercise such of the
discretion conferred upon the Attorney General by law as is appropriate to the
disposition of such appeals . . .
Id. (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 90.3).
Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, supra note 3.
42

43

44
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eliminated the Special Inquiry Boards and, instead, appointed special
inquiry officers to decide deportation cases. 45 The statute lays out the
definition and responsibilities of these officers:
The term “special inquiry officer” means any immigration officer who
the Attorney General deems specially qualified to conduct specified classes
of proceedings, in whole or in part, required by this Act to be conducted by
or before a special inquiry officer and who is designated and selected by the
Attorney General, individually or by regulation, to conduct such
proceedings. Such special inquiry officer shall be subject to such supervision
and shall perform such duties, not inconsistent with this Act, as the Attorney
General shall prescribe. 46
Indeed, the Attorney General decides who qualifies to conduct these
important proceedings. The special inquiry officers “shall perform such
duties . . . as the Attorney General shall prescribe.” 47 The officers perform
their duties with the intention of satisfying the Attorney General’s ultimate
goals—political or otherwise. The Immigration and Nationality Act
essentially established the first set of immigration judges that were not part
of the judicial branch of the United States government. This trend continues
in the latter half of the twentieth century.
By 1973, regulations authorized special inquiry officers to adopt the
title of “immigration judges” and to wear judicial robes. 48 Special inquiry
officers were already conducting hearings as if they were judges, but the
regulation made the title of “immigration judges” official. Immigration
judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals would remain this way until
the DOJ created an entirely new agency in 1983. 49

D. The Creation of a New Agency
In an effort “to improve the management, direction and control of
the immigration judicial review programs,” the Attorney General created
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) in 1983. 50 Still within
45

66 STAT. 163, 82 CONG. CH. 477 § 242(b) (1952).

46

Id. at § 101(b)(4).
Id.

47

“The term ‘immigration judge’ means special inquiry officer and may be used
interchangeably with the term special inquiry officer whenever it appears in this chapter.”
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, 38 Fed. Reg. 8,590, 8,590
(April 4, 1973) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1.1).
Evolution of the U.S. Immigration Court System: Pre-1983, supra note 3.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 48 Fed. Reg. 8,038, 8,038 (Feb. 25, 1983)
(codified at 8 C.F.R. Part 1).
A report titled The Attorney General’s Judges, How the U.S. Immigration
Courts Became a Deportation Tool provides a background of the creation of
48

49
50
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the DOJ and under supervision of the Attorney General, the EOIR sought
to consolidate “similar quasi-judicial functions within a similar organization
and will result in a more effective and efficient operation of the
Department’s immigration judicial review programs.” 51
The EOIR has only gained authority since its creation. Following the
enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which
largely made it illegal for employers to knowingly hire an unauthorized
immigrant, 52new immigration issues began to arise. In 1987, within the
EOIR, regulations were implemented to authorize the Office of the Chief
Administrative Officer to decide cases related to illegal hiring, employment
sanctions, and unfair immigration-related employment practices. 53
Most importantly—and for purposes of this note—the EOIR
adjudicates removal proceedings for aliens and their families. 54 In order for
an alien to be removed, it must be established “by clear and convincing
evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been admitted to the United
States, the alien is deportable. No decision on deportability shall be valid
unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.” 55
On the outset, this statute sounds just because it guarantees the alien
cannot be deported without cause—the case must be based on “reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence.” 56 However, the issue remains that the
EOIR and immigration judges are products of the Attorney General, so
“reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence” become much more
subjective. Importantly, the Attorney General is appointed by the
the EOIR: “Its development was a reaction to widespread critiques that the preexisting system was under-resourced, overburdened, violative of procedural
rights, and embedded in an enforcement-driven context. However, despite
broad agreement on the need for systemic reform, Congress did not pass
legislation to improve the immigration court structure.” Instead, the EOIR was
created “by regulation.”

The Attorney General’s Judges, How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became a Deportation
Tool,
SPLC
SOUTHERN
POVERTY
LAW
CENTER
7
(June
2019),
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/com_policyreport_the_attorney_generals_judge
s_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C2N-YKLH] [hereinafter The Attorney General’s Judges].
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 48 Fed. Reg. 8,038, 8,039 (Feb. 25, 1983)
(codified at 8 C.F.R. Part 1).
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 274A(a)(1)(A), 100
Stat. 3,359, 3,360 (1986).
Organization of the Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Matters, 52
Fed. Reg. 44,971, 44,971 (Nov. 24, 1987) (codified at 28 C.F.R. Part 0).
“At the conclusion of the proceeding the immigration judge shall decide whether an alien
is removable from the United States. The determination of the immigration judge shall be
based only on the evidence produced at the hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2019).
Id. at (1)(A).
51

52

53

54

55
56

Id.
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President 57 and is privy to his political and policy leanings. “Reasonable,
substantial, and probative” can be interpreted in a way that disfavors aliens
and their families—all to satisfy the desires of the Attorney General and the
President of the United States.
Federal and state judges, on the other hand, do not have the same type
of political pressure. Even though federal judges are elected, they do not
face the same type of scrutiny as immigration judges, who have the Attorney
General breathing down their necks. As this note explores in the next
section, there are vast differences between federal and state judges and
immigration judges.
III. JUDICIARY COMPARISONS

A.

Federal and State Judges

The Model Code of Judicial Conduct regulates the conduct of federal
and state judges in the United States; the Code states that “[a] judge shall
uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” 58
If a judge does not uphold the standard according to the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, they are subject to discipline handed down by the
American Bar Association (ABA). If a judge violates the Model Rules and
receives a complaint, it is mandated that “[a] judge shall cooperate and be
candid and honest with judicial and lawyer disciplinary agencies.” 59
The Model Code and the ABA regulate the rules judges must follow.
Judges have a moral obligation to rule on cases in an impartial way “that
promotes public confidence in the . . . judiciary.” 60 Further, “[a] judge shall
not permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests or
relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.” 61 The
comment to Rule 2.4 describes this obligation in detail:
[1] An independent judiciary requires that judges decide cases
according to the law and facts, without regard to whether
particular laws or litigants are popular or unpopular with the
public, the media, government officials, or the judge’s friends or
family. Confidence in the judiciary is eroded if judicial decision

57
58
59
60
61

28 U.S.C. § 503 (1966).
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANNON 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
Id. at r. 2.16(A) (2014).
Id. at r. 1.2 (2014).
Id. at r. 2.4(B) (2014).
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making is perceived to be subject to inappropriate outside
influences. 62
Judges cannot make rulings based on influences from anyone and,
relevant for this note, certainly cannot decide cases with influence from
“government officials.” 63
Immigration judges, on the other hand, are at the mercy of the
executive branch and can be pressured to rule in a way that aligns with the
political views of the President. The creation of the EOIR was intended to
“increase judicial independence and remove the appearance of
prosecutorial bias”; however, these goals have not been accomplished due
to the Attorney General’s overbearing control and overbroad discretionary
powers. 64 Of course, not all immigration judges are influenced in this way.
This note is not an attempt to unfairly criticize immigration judges; rather,
this note aims to aid the hard-working immigration judges in the United
States by persuading Congress that immigration adjudication does not
belong in the executive branch due to the obvious separation of powers
issue. Immigration judges are currently limited in their opportunities to rule
in a way that is fair to all.
Further, immigration judges and state and federal judges are defined
differently because immigration judges are not appointed powers from the
U.S. Constitution. 65 When compared to the better-known procedures of
state and federal courts, it is clear that immigration judges have difficulties
remaining impartial.

62
63
64

Id. at r. 2.4 cmt. 1 (2014).
Id.
The Attorney General’s Judges, supra note 50, at 7. The Innovation Law Lab & Southern

Poverty Law Center report discusses the overbearing control of the Attorney General:
From the outset, the attorney general’s control over the EOIR has undermined
its independence by exposing immigration judges to prosecutorial and political
pressures. The Department of Justice is, after all, the nation’s leading prosecutor
and law enforcement agency. It is not, by its very nature, a judicial agency. By
keeping the immigration adjudication function inside the Department of Justice,
the attorney general kept the EOIR under his unitary control.

Id.
Id.
65

Immigration judge’s . . . authority does not derive from Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, which established the judicial branch. Immigration judges are not
even ‘administrative law judges,’ whose authority derives from Article I of the
Constitution and who conduct proceedings under the Administrative Procedure
Act. . . [I]mmigration judges are the attorney general’s attorneys who decide
immigration claims of individuals the government is trying to deport.

Id.

2020]
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Comparison of Immigration Trials and Criminal Trials
1.

Immigration Trials Generally

There are different circumstances that lead people to immigration
court: refugees forced to flee their countries can apply for asylum in the
United States; 66 people on the verge of deportation may request
“cancellation of removal” allowing them to stay in the country; 67 and others
may be pursuing citizenship.
“Refugee” is defined in the statute:
The term “refugee” means (A) any person who is outside any country of such
person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion. . .
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2019).
The statute first provides ways in which a permanent resident may be granted a cancellation
of removal:
(a) Cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents. The Attorney
General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or
deportable from the United States if the alien—
(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than
5 years,
(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been
admitted in any status, and
(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
Section (b) goes provides instances when cancellation of removal may be granted for
nonpermanent residents:
(b) Cancellation of removal and adjustment of status for certain nonpermanent
residents.
(1) In general. The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to the
status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is
inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien—
(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of
not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application;
(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period;
(C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), or
237(a)(3) [8 USCS § 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3)], subject to paragraph
(5); and
(D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
66

67
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These types of cases will be heard by one of the approximately 400
immigration judges in one of the sixty-three immigration courts in the
United States. 68 In August 2019, there were over one million pending
immigration cases, which equates to 2,500 cases per judge. 69 This backlog of
cases is an unrealistic amount of work for just 400 immigration judges; there
are simply too many cases to be heard and not enough time to hear them.
Such delays can be construed as a violation of the judicial process that
immigrants are due. 70
In her article outlining how immigration courts work, Fatma Marouf,
Professor of Law at Texas A&M University, compares immigration
proceedings with criminal trials; however, she makes some important
distinctions. 71 Immigrants, for example, do not enjoy the same Sixth
Amendment 72 constitutional protections as a criminal defendant. 73 Though
immigrants are not entitled to a court-appointed attorney, they are permitted
to hire or accept one via pro-bono services. 74
Immigrants who have been convicted of a crime are subject to
mandatory detention during their hearings. 75 Marouf provides that convicted
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge [https://perma.cc/SMH62KQR].
Judge Ashley Tabaddor, president of the National Association of Immigration Judges
states: “If nothing else, the continuing rise of the backlog shows that the immigration court is
broken . . . . Until we fix the design defect of having a court in a law enforcement agency, we
will not be able to address the backlog in a fair and effective manner.” Priscilla Alvarez,
Immigration court backlog exceeds 1 million cases, data group says, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/18/politics/immigration-court-backlog/index.html
[https://perma.cc/933K-8QEH].
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Courts have consistently held that immigrants are protected
by the Constitution’s right to due process.
68

69

70

Fatma Marouf, How immigration court works, THE CONVERSATION,
https://theconversation.com/how-immigration-court-works-98678 [https://perma.cc/RH8R3RFN].
The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Marouf, supra note 71.
Marouf, supra note 71.
The statute lists the circumstances when an alien faces mandatory detention:
71

72

73
74
75
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immigrants “are often brought into the courtroom wearing a jumpsuit and
shackles” even if they only committed a low-level offense. 76 Furthermore, an
overwhelming majority of them have no choice but to appear without a
lawyer. 77

2.

Trial Comparisons

Immigration trials lack additional constitutional defenses required in
criminal trials beyond just the Sixth Amendment. To reiterate, immigration
judges are part of the DOJ, which is overseen by the Attorney General.
Additionally, it is relevant to discuss immigration trial prosecutors. These
prosecutors are attorneys hired by the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement—an agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—
to represent the United States government. 78 The political goals of the DOJ
and DHS are certainly of the same flavor because both departments are run
by the executive branch. 79 Both departments are part of what the White
House refers to as “the Cabinet”—“an advisory body made up of the heads
of the 15 executive departments. Appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate, the members of the Cabinet are often the President’s closest
confidants.” 80
The political views of immigration judges and prosecutors of
immigration cases are of the same vein, which will undoubtedly yield unjust
results for immigrants being tried. In a federal trial, judges are part of an
independent judiciary, which is an entirely separate branch of the United
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who—
(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in
section 1182(a)(2) of this title,
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,
(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an
offense for which the alien has been sentence to a term of imprisonment of at
least 1 year, or
(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under
section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,
when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on
parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien
may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2019).
Marouf, supra note 71.
Marouf, supra note 71.
Marouf, supra note 71.
The Executive Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-whitehouse/the-executive-branch/ [https://perma.cc/3ZCT-Y6HT].
Id.
76
77
78
79

80
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States government. 81 There is a deliberate separation of powers between the
three branches of government that is the backbone of the United States
Constitution and was implemented as so to avoid tyranny and too much
power for one particular branch. 82 In the Federalist Papers No. 51, James
Madison writes that “the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several
offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the
private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights.” 83
The separation of powers issue will be discussed further in Section V.
In a criminal trial, the judiciary is responsible for ruling in a just way
on the merits of the case. Federal judges are not coerced into ruling one way
or the other and do not face pressures from their superiors to rule in a way
that satisfies a political agenda. State judges are elected and some of their
decisions may influence their chances at being reelected; however, this does
not carry the same pressure coming from a superior. Simply put, federal
judges are impartial. In comparison, immigration judges are at the mercy of
the Attorney General to get through as many cases as possible to decongest
the already overwhelmed immigration courts. 84 The emphasis is on
efficiency over justice and ruling on the merits of the case. 85 The situation
often involves an unrepresented alien who has been convicted of a crime
appearing in front of an immigration judge who faces pressure from the
Attorney General to expedite cases. 86
This note proposes that the National Association of Immigration
Judges (NAIJ) seek independence with the creation of an independent court
system specifically for immigration cases. Though, of course, this is easier
said than done. The content of this note explains why the immigration
judiciary would be better off as an independent court. One major reason for
this call to action is the overbearing, unchecked powers of the executive
branch.
Marouf, supra note 71.
In the Federalist No. 47, James Madison writes about the particular structure of the new
government and the distribution of power among its different branches: “The accumulation
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few,
or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
Marouf, supra note 71.
Greg Chen, DOJ puts its integrity in doubt by interfering with immigration courts, THE
HILL, (Feb. 27, 2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/484966-doj-puts-its-integrityin-doubt-by-interfering-with-immigration-courts [https://perma.cc/2K4M-7K3G].
Joel Rose, Sessions Pushes To Speed Up Immigration Courts, Deportations, NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO, (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/29/597863489/sessions-wantto-overrule-judges-who-put-deportation-cases-on-hold [https://perma.cc/8T35-ZJUH].
81
82

83
84
85

86
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IV. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S INCREASE OF POWER

A.

The Trump Administration’s Attempt at Union Busting

President Donald Trump’s attempt to further increase the power of
the executive branch comes at the cost of federal immigration judges. On
Friday, August 9, 2019, the DOJ filed a petition with the Federal Labor
Relations Authority to strip the rights of immigration judges to be
represented by a union. 87 The DOJ justifies this by asserting that
immigration judges are “management officials who formulate and advance
policy.” 88 Under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations statute,
a “management official” cannot be part of a union and is defined as “an
individual employed by an agency in a position [that] require[s] or
authorize[s] the individual to formulate, determine, or influence the policies
of the agency . . . .” 89 Judge Ashley Tabaddor, President of the (NAIJ),
responded to the petition:
This is nothing more than a desperate attempt by the DOJ to evade
transparency and accountability, and undermine the decisional
independence of the nation’s 440 Immigration Judges. We are trial court
judges who make decisions on the basis of case specific facts and the nation’s
immigration laws. We do not set policies, and we don’t manage staff. 90
As individual employees of the DOJ, immigration judges cannot speak
out publicly and are prohibited from lobbying Congress or the DOJ. 91 The
NAIJ is the recognized representative for collective bargaining for all United
States immigration judges and therefore, is the only avenue by which
immigration judges can speak independently to voice their interests. 92 If this
Doc. No. 19081303, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, (Aug. 13, 2019),
https://www.aila.org/File/Related/19081303a.pdf [https://perma.cc/4S6C-M585].
See also Daniel M. Kowalski, DOJ Attack on Immigration Judges ‘Union Busting Plain and
Simple,’
LEXISNEXIS
LEGAL
NEWSROOM,
(Aug.
14,
2019),
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/outsidenews/posts/doj-attack-onimmigration-judges-union-busting-plain-and-simple [https://perma.cc/6J3C-3SR2].
87

88

Id.

5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(11) (2019).
Richard Gonzales, Trump Administration Seeks Decertification Of Immigration Judges'
Union,
NATIONAL
PUBLIC
RADIO,
(Aug.
12,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/12/750656176/trump-administration-seeks-decertification-ofimmigration-judges-union [https://perma.cc/B38S-DC8N]. See also Adam Shaw, Trump
administration seeks to break up immigration judges’ union, FOX NEWS, (Aug. 9, 2019),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-administration-looks-to-break-up-immigrationjudges-union [https://perma.cc/2HKF-W6RJ].
About the NAIJ , NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES, https://www.naijusa.org/about [https://perma.cc/3W5K-MJ63].
89
90

91

92

Id.
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attempt by the DOJ to union bust was successful, immigration judges would
have no practical way to advocate for their interests. 93 The DOJ is looking
for any way to strip immigration judges’ power to unionize, and, by being
labeled “management officials,” immigration judges would not be
authorized to form a union. 94 The DOJ contends that the role of
immigration judges is increasing because they are now determining
immigration policies, 95 which would satisfy the “management official”
requirements of the statute. 96
The NAIJ was created to represent immigration judges in 1971. 97 In
2000, the NAIJ affiliated with International Federation of Professional and
Technical Engineers (IFPTE), a larger union representing NASA rocket
scientists, engineers employed by the U.S. Navy and the Army Corp of
Engineers, and administrative law judges who hear cases involving Social
Security claims. 98 President of IFPTE, Paul Shearon, also responded to the
DOJ’s petition on behalf of immigration judges:
This is nothing more than union busting plain and simple, and part of
a disturbing pattern. The White House has signed a series of executive
orders that limit the ability of federal unions to raise questions about abuses
and inefficiencies, and they have tried to hinder a union’s ability to fully
represent federal workers who are often stuck in a bureaucratic maze. This
administration doesn’t want to be held accountable, and they especially
don’t want anyone looking over their shoulder on immigration issues. 99
Tabaddor and Shearson are explicitly calling out the executive branch
for abusing its power by trying to “hinder” the NAIJ’s ability to fairly
represent immigration judges. 100 To this point, the NAIJ has long advocated
for immigration judges to be removed from the DOJ and placed in an
independent agency much like the bankruptcy and tax courts. 101
The petition was submitted to the Federal Labor Relations
Authority, and both sides will have a chance to argue their case. If the
93

Id.

5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(11) (2019).
U.S. DOJ, Petition to F.L.R.A. on Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR),
AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION
LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION,
(Aug.
9,
2019)
https://www.aila.org/File/Related/19081303a.pdF [https://perma.cc/W76D-GFBF]. See also
Shaw, supra note 90.
A “management official” is “. . . an individual employed by an agency in a position the
duties and responsibilities of which require or authorize the individual to formulate,
determine, or influence the policies of the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(11) (2019).
Shaw, supra note 90.
Kowalski, supra note 86.
Kowalski, supra note 86.
Kowalski, supra note 86.
Kowalski, supra note 86.
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decertification is successful, the executive branch will gain more power by
supervising immigration judges’ work schedules, where judges are sent, and
quotas for the amount of cases each judge should complete. 102 Without a
union, the NAIJ would essentially be stripped of its voice and the ability to
publicly disagree with the implementation of unfair policies. An example of
one of these unfair policies comes at the hands of former Attorney General
Jeff Sessions.

B.

Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ Review Process

President Trump’s views on immigration are of no secret to anyone
due to his drastic, wide-reaching policy changes. In tandem with former
Attorney General Jeff Sessions, President Trump sought rapid deportations
in the adjudication process. Regulations issued by the DOJ give power to
the Attorney General to review Board cases that are referred to himself, the
Board, or the Secretary of Homeland Security. 103 This review mechanism
has been widely criticized for good reasons. First, the Attorney General
power is able to review cases in which he lacks subject matter expertise
compared to members of the Board. 104 Second, he is able to review cases
without meaningful participation by the parties and without notice to the
parties. 105 These criticisms invoke unfairness to the parties involved, which
seems from the outset to be a power that should be outside the authority of
the Attorney General. The administration’s effort to expedite immigration
cases is a step in the right direction; however, it is going about it in an unjust
way.
Shaw, supra note 90.
The statute reads, in part:
(1) The Board shall refer to the Attorney General for review of its decision all
cases that:
(i) The Attorney General directs the Board to refer to him.
(ii) The Chairman or a majority of the Board believes should be referred to the
Attorney General for review.
(iii) The Secretary of Homeland Security, or specific officials of the Department
of Homeland Security designated by the Secretary with the concurrence of the
Attorney General, refers to the Attorney General for review.
(2) In any case the Attorney General decides, the Attorney General’s decision
shall be stated in writing and shall be transmitted to the Board or Secretary, as
appropriate, for transmittal and service as provided in paragraph (f) of this
section.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2019).
Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreaching in Immigration Adjudication, 93 TUL.

102
103

104

REV. 707, 741 (2019).
105

Id. at 742.
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The most relevant criticism for purposes of this note is the Attorney
General’s decisions based on a political basis rather than on the actual
merits of the case. 106 Indeed, former Attorney General Sessions took full
advantage of this review process. In his law review article, former Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales writes that “Attorney General referral and review
is a potent tool through which the executive branch can lawfully advance its
immigration policy agenda.” 107 Former Attorney General Gonzales knows
first-hand that the power to review immigration cases can be an avenue to
advance particular political agendas. The attorneys general under both
Clinton and Obama used this review process a total of seven times over
eight years; comparatively, Sessions used it four times during his short,
twenty-one month tenure. 108 Former attorneys general most often used the
review mechanism in situations when cases were referred to by the Board. 109
Sessions, instead, used his own certification process by choosing cases he
wanted to review and instructing the Board to refer specific cases to him. 110
Specifically, Sessions’ use of the review process stripped the
procedural rights of parties in immigration proceedings, which some have
viewed as an attempt to advance policies aligned with President Trump. 111
The four instances when Sessions used his review power (discussed below)
illustrate this issue.

1.

Matter of E-F-H-L-

112

In Matter of E-F-H-L-, the respondent applied for asylum and
withholding of removal. 113 The immigration judge denied the application
because it did not demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief and,
therefore, determined respondent was not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. 114 The respondent appealed on the merits to the Board of
Immigration Appeals. 115 The Board remanded and held that a respondent
applying for asylum and withholding of removal was “ordinarily entitled to

Id.
See Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration
Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 920
106
107

(2016).
Marouf, supra note 104, at 744.
Marouf, supra note 104, at 744.
Marouf, supra note 104, at 742, 744.
Marouf, supra note 104, at 744.
Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 (A.G. 2018).

108
109
110
111
112
113

Id.

114

Matter of E-F-H-L-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 319 (B.I.A. 2014).

115

E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 226.
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a full evidentiary hearing.” 116 At this point, respondent withdrew his
application for asylum because he became eligible to legalize his status
through family-based application, “which provides a much more
straightforward path to permanent residence.” 117 In her law review article on
the executive branch’s role in immigration adjudication, Professor Fatma E.
Marouf explains the reasoning for this decision:
Since the USCIS [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services], not the
immigration court, has jurisdiction over family-based petitions, the parties
filed a joint motion to administratively close the removal proceedings, which
would allow the judge to take the case temporarily off the court’s docket to
give USCIS time to make a decision. The IJ naturally granted that joint
motion. 118
The Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals held that
respondent is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing based on precedent 119 and
federal regulations. 120 The regulation states that “[a]pplications for asylum
and withholding of removal so filed will be decided by the immigration
judge . . . after an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual issues in dispute.” 121
Sessions then stepped in and used his review process powers to strip
procedural rights of parties in removal proceedings. He vacated the Board’s
decision and directed the matter to be calendared and restored to the active
docket of the Immigration Court. 122 In his one-page opinion, Sessions
reasoned that:
[b]ecause the application for relief which served as the predicate
for the evidentiary hearing required by the Board has been
withdrawn with prejudice, the Board’s decision is effectively
mooted. I accordingly vacate the decision of the Board in this

116

Id.

Marouf, supra note 104, at 745.
Marouf, supra note 104, at 745.
See Matter of Fefe, 20 I. & N. Dec. 116, 117–18 (A.G. 1989).
Federal regulations state:
Applications for asylum and withholding of removal so filed will be decided by
the immigration judge pursuant to the requirements and standards established
in 8 CFR part 1208 of this chapter after an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual
issues in dispute. An evidentiary hearing extending beyond issues related to the
basis for a mandatory denial of the application pursuant to § 1208.14 or §
1208.16 of this chapter is not necessary once the immigration judge has
determined that such a denial is required.
8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(3) (2019).

117
118
119
120

121

Id.

122

Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 (A.G. 2018).
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matter, and I also direct that this matter be recalendared and
restored to the active docket of the Immigration Court. 123
Sessions mooted the Board’s decision, going against years of precedent
and regulated procedural rights for parties in immigration cases. 124
Moreover, Sessions’ remand came with no citing of the federal regulations
allowing an evidentiary hearing. 125 Marouf contends that this decision was
the first step to narrow the procedural rights of noncitizens and to speed up
the removal proceedings. 126 Why else would Sessions direct the Board to
refer this particular case to himself, and then rule in a way that goes against
established law? Sessions was, however, well within his authority as Attorney
General to intervene and remand any case he wished—and therein lies the
issue. It is obvious that Matter of E-F-H-L- was not ruled on the merits of
the case; rather, the decision was made by Sessions with political
implications in mind. In an effort to expedite removal proceedings, Sessions
stepped in and ensured that this particular noncitizen would not be granted
asylum nor withholding of removal. Due to the insurmountable number of
immigration cases in the docket, Sessions used his review power to decrease
that number.

2.

Matter of Castro-Tum

127

Sessions used his review process for the second time in his decision
of Matter of Castro-Tum holding that immigration judges and the Board are
not authorized to administratively close cases. 128 Administrative closure is
when a case is put on hold and removal proceedings are delayed to allow
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to work
on visa and green card applications of respondents. 129 This gives respondents
(and the USCIS) adequate time to complete the complicated administrative
requirements necessary to obtain a visa or green card. 130 Additionally,
administrative closure gives respondents a fair opportunity to stay in the

123

Id.

124

Marouf, supra note 104, at 745.
See E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 226.
Marouf, supra note 104, at 746.

125
126
127

Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018).

128

Id. at 271.

Louisa Edzie, Matter of Castro-Tum: The Future of Administrative Closures and Due
IMMIGR.
&
HUM.
RTS.
L.
REV.
(Feb.
25,
2019),
https://lawblogs.uc.edu/ihrlr/2019/02/25/matter-of-castro-tum-the-future-of-administrativeclosures-and-due-process/ [https://perma.cc/36VC-ULVD].
129

Process,

130

Id.
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United States without being removed on a technicality regarding their
paperwork. 131
The court in Matter of Bavakan Avetisyan provides a succinct
explanation:
Administrative closure, which is available to an Immigration
Judge and the Board, is used to temporarily remove a case from
an Immigration Judge’s active calendar or from the Board’s
docket. In general, administrative closure may be appropriate to
await an action or event that is relevant to immigration
proceedings but is outside the control of the parties or the court
and may not occur for a significant or undetermined period of
time. 132
Administrative closure is a fair way of letting things play out that are
out of the hands of the parties involved. Not only does administrative
closure help the respondents, but it also helps the immigration judges
because, for the time being, that particular case is removed from their
docket and they can tackle the next on the list.
Sessions, however, appointed himself to the case of Matter of CastroTum 133 and reversed years of precedent allowing immigration judges to
administratively close cases. 134 He ruled that “immigration judges and the
Board may only administratively close a case where a previous regulation or
a previous judicially approved settlement expressly authorizes such an
action.” 135 In his opinion, Sessions argues that administrative closure
undermines the ability to “swiftly adjudicate immigration cases” and that
respondents who fail to appear should be issued deportation orders. 136
Once again, Sessions used his review powers to strip the rights of aliens
in immigration cases and, in this particular case, the due process rights for
respondents. In this case specifically, due process rights for respondents. 137
Sessions argues:
Immigration judges exercise only the authority provided by
statute or delegated by the Attorney General. Congress has never
131

Id.

Matter of Bavakan Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 692 (B.I.A. 2012) (internal citations
omitted).
Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 281.
Marouf, supra note 104, at 746.
Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 271.
Id. at 290.
See The Attorney General’s Judges, supra note 50, at 17. The report discusses how the
Attorney General’s office “has abused its controversial certification power in ways that further
jeopardize asylum seekers’ access to a fair hearing.” The Attorney General’s Judges, supra
note 50, at 24.
132

133
134
135
136
137
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authorized administrative closures in a statute, and Department
of Justice regulations only permit administrative closure in
specific categories of cases. The Attorney General has never
delegated the general authority, and I decline to do so now. Cases
that have been administratively closed absent a specific
authorizing regulatory provision or judicially approved settlement
shall be recalendared upon motion of either party. I overrule all
Board precedents inconsistent with this opinion and remand for
further proceedings. 138
Despite these comments, immigration judges do hold certain
independent responsibilities when it comes to determining cases. Federal
regulations state “immigration judges shall exercise their independent
judgment and discretion and may take any action consistent with their
authorities . . . that is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such
cases.” 139 Immigration judges were using their “independent judgement”
when administratively closing cases in order appropriately adjudicate
immigration proceedings. Sessions did not like these cases being put on
hold to be determined later—his goal was to adjudicate and deport as fast as
possible to clear the decks for quicker decisions. 140 Unfortunately, this way
of stripping due process rights from noncitizens is well within the Attorney
General’s power.

3.

Matter of L-A-B-R-

141

Matter of L-A-B-R- is the third case when Sessions used the review
process to overturn a case in which he was unhappy with how the Board
ruled. This case involved evaluating when a continuance is appropriately
granted. Continuances involve due process and give noncitizens the ability
to find a representative, obtain evidence, present testimony, and receive a
decision from the USCIS for a pending visa application that would create a
path to legal status. 142 Federal regulations permit an immigration judge to

138

Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 274.

8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2019).
In his opinion, Sessions argued that there was:
. . . no basis for inferring that immigration judges or the Board possess a general
power to order administrative closure based on some inherent adjudicatory
authority. The fact that federal district courts employ administrative closure as
a docket-management tool to temporarily defer adjudication on the merits
during the pendency of other proceedings does not justify the practice here.
Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 291.
Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018).
Marouf, supra note 104, at 747.
139
140

141
142
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“grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown.” 143 Sessions
intervened and eventually ordered all future cases involving continuances
be referred to him for review. 144 Sessions questioned the standard for “good
cause” in continuance cases and eventually narrowed the definition to
reduce the possibility for continuance motions to be granted. 145
Sessions agrees that immigration judges “should continue to apply a
multifactor test to assess whether good cause exists for a continuance for a
collateral proceeding, but that the decision should turn primarily on the
likelihood that the collateral relief will be granted and will materially affect
the outcome of the removal proceedings.” 146 This multifactor test had been
the standard for deciding good cause, but Sessions makes an important
distinction in Matter of L-A-B-R-.
Sessions explicitly provides when a continuance may not be granted:
“Good cause also may not exist when the alien has not demonstrated
reasonable diligence in pursuing the collateral adjudication, DHS justifiably
opposes the motion, or the requested continuance is unreasonably long,
among other possibilities.” 147 Sessions further constricts granting
continuance by holding that “good cause does not exist if the alien’s visa
priority date is too remote to raise the prospect of adjustment of status above
the speculative level.” 148 In her article, Marouf points out that this restriction
vastly affects the number of noncitizens that would be granted a
continuance. 149 She specifically mentions those waiting for family-based visas
to become available, including spouses of permanent residents and
unaccompanied minors waiting for the USCIS to make particular
decisions. 150 In some of these situations, all a noncitizen would need is time
in order to be legally authorized to stay in the country. This is the main point
of a continuance—to provide noncitizens due process and a ruling on the
merits of the case.
Sessions, however, was more interested in administrative efficiency.
He instructed immigration judges to consider administrative efficiency when
deciding whether to grant a continuance because “at bottom, continuances

8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2019).
“I direct the Board of Immigration Appeals to refer these cases to me for review of its
decisions. The Board’s decisions in these matters are automatically stayed pending my
review.” Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 245, 245 (A.G. 2018).
L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 419.
Id. at 412.
143
144

145
146
147
148
149
150

Id.
Id. at 418.
Marouf, supra note 104, at 749.
Marouf, supra note 104, at 749.
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are themselves intended to promote efficient case management.” 151
However, promoting efficiency over due process puts noncitizens in a much
more difficult position to receive a fair trial. By not providing parties with
the time that they need to find a representative, obtain evidence, or present
testimony, they are not being afforded their due process rights for a fair trial.
Once again, Sessions used his review process to expedite immigration cases
in order to decrease the amount of immigration adjudication and increase
the number of deportations. 152

4.

Matter of A-B-

153

Matter of A-B- is the final case in which Sessions instructed the
Board to refer a case to himself. The case discusses when the dismissal of
asylum claims are appropriate and has increased the amount of asylum
claims dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. 154 Statutory provisions list
five protected groups for asylum: race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group, or political opinion. 155 The category in question in
Matter of A-B- is membership of a particular group which, according to
Marouf, is the most difficult to define. 156
In this case, the respondent claimed she was eligible for asylum
because she was persecuted for being a member of a particular social group
of “‘El Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their domestic
relationships where they have children in common’ with their partners.” 157
Respondent shares three children with her ex-husband, and she claims that
he repeatedly abused her during and after their marriage. 158 Upon appeal,
151
152

L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 416.
Marouf, supra note 104, at 752.

Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
Marouf, supra note 104, at 752.
The statute reads, in part:
(A) Safe third country. Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien if the Attorney
General determines that the alien may be removed, pursuant to a bilateral or
multilateral agreement, to a country (other than the country of the alien’s
nationality or, in the case of an alien having no nationality, the country of the
alien’s last habitual residence) in which the alien’s life or freedom would not be
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion, and where the alien would have access to a
full and fair procedure for determining a claim to asylum or equivalent
temporary protection, unless the Attorney General finds that it is in the public
interest for the alien to receive asylum in the United States.
8 U.S.C.S. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (2019).
Marouf, supra note 104, at 752.
A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 321.

153
154
155

156
157
158

Id.
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the Board found that respondent’s particular social group was sufficient to
grant asylum, 159 and this is when Sessions assigned the case to himself.
In his opinion, Sessions stated that “claims by aliens pertaining to
domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors
will not qualify for asylum.” 160 He goes on to say that “[t]he mere fact that a
country may have problems effectively policing certain crimes—such as
domestic violence or gang violence—or that certain populations are more
likely to be victims of crime, cannot itself establish an asylum claim.” 161
After Sessions’s decision in A-B-, the USCIS sent out new
instructions for asylum officers advising them on the impact of the A-Bdecision on asylum interviews. 162 This was an effort to dismiss asylum cases
even earlier before trial and, therefore, further expedite removal
proceedings. 163 However, these instructions and the determination that
victims of domestic violence or gang violence will not necessarily qualify for
asylum were found to be unlawful by the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia in Grace v. Whitaker. 164 A group of plaintiffs
brought action against the Attorney General after their interview for asylum
was denied. The opinion states that “[a]lthough the asylum officers found
that plaintiffs’ accounts were sincere, the officers denied their claims after
applying the standards set forth in a recent precedential immigration
decision issued by then-Attorney General, Jefferson B. Sessions.” 165 The
court ruled for the plaintiffs, determining that the general rule constructed
by A-B- is “arbitrary and capricious because there is no legal basis for an
effective categorical ban on domestic violence and gang-related claims.” 166
159
160
161
162
163

Id.
Id. at 320.
Id.
Marouf, supra note 104, at 754.
Marouf, supra note 104, at 755.

344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 127 (2018). In addition to overturning well-settled case law, A-Bdisrupted a long-term consensus between the government and immigration advocates that
domestic violence, in certain circumstances, is an appropriate basis for granting asylum. The
SPLC Southern Poverty Law Center report also discusses this qualification for asylum:
There has never been a categorical bar against such claims, nor a blanket rule that all claims
involving domestic violence are valid. Rather, each case has traditionally been assessed on its
merits, measured against the same general standards applicable to all claims. Reaching
beyond the facts of the case before him, Sessions held that few claims pertaining to domestic
or gang violence perpetrated by nongovernmental actors would qualify for asylum—an
attempt to set forth a new policy that would make the vast majority of claims related to
domestic violence or gang violence fail “in practice.”
The Attorney General’s Judges, supra note 50, at 18.
Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 105.
Id. at 126.
164

165
166
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The court references the amendment to immigration laws giving
aliens with a credible fear of persecution by his or her country of origin the
opportunity for asylum. 167 The entire point was to provide aliens asylum, so
they would not be subjected to further persecution. 168 The court further
explains Sessions’ errors:
The general rule is also arbitrary and capricious because it
impermissibly heightens the standard at the credible fear stage.
The Attorney General’s direction to deny most domestic violence
or gang violence claims at the credible fear determination stage is
fundamentally inconsistent with the threshold screening standard
that Congress established: an alien’s removal may not be
expedited if there is a “significant possibility” that the alien could
establish eligibility for asylum. 169
In A-B-, Sessions went against the intent of Congress in determining
asylum eligibility for aliens in fear of prosecution. The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia ruled against Sessions in an effort to
combat the executive branch’s goal of decreasing the number of aliens it lets
into the United States.
In all four cases Sessions instructed the Board to refer to himself. 170
Sessions used his power as the Attorney General to review immigration
cases that did not need reviewing. This type of interference with previously
adjudicated cases would be less likely to happen if immigration courts were
Article I courts because biases of the President could no longer be a factor.
In Matter of A-B-, the plaintiffs were forced to bring legal action to manifest
their rights as aliens deserving asylum (or at least a fair trial to determine
whether they were).
V. SEPARATION OF POWERS—IS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OVERSTEPPING BOUNDARIES?

A.

Separation of Powers Background

Since the enactment of the constitution, the United States government
has been based on the separation of powers doctrine. In the Federalist
Papers 51, James Madison explains why the constitution was written in a
way that disperses power among three government branches: executive,

167
168
169
170

Id. at 104.
Id.
Id. at 126–27.
See The Attorney General’s Judges, supra note 50, at 4, 25–26; Marouf, supra note 103,

at 746–47, 751, 755.
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legislative, and judicial. 171 Due to the overbearing tyranny of the Crown, the
new United States drafted its constitution to avoid one particular authority
reigning tyranny on its citizens. Madison explains that a “partition of power”
is necessary to avoid “oppression of its rulers.” 172 This has been one of the
cornerstones of democracy since the birth of the country; however, the
current constitution is not a first draft. Before the constitution as it is written
today, the Articles of Confederation existed. 173
The Articles of Confederation was a first effort in outlining the
fundamental principles for the United States, and there was room for
improvement. For example, the Articles gave the states collective power
over the federal government, and Congress was the only existing branch of
government at that time. 174 Given there was only one branch of government,
there certainly was not separation of powers. Congress’s powers were
limited; it had the ability to go to war, but there was no money to do so
because it was unable to tax the states. 175 The states’ “league of friendship”
in accordance with the limited powers of Congress proved to be
fundamental principles that a country could not be built upon. 176
James Madison describes how the separated powers government can thrive:
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the
different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all
hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each
department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so
constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in
the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously
adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive,
legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain
of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever
with one another.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).

171

172

Id.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781.
The relevant articles are quoted below:
Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to
the United States, in Congress assembled.
Id. at art. II.
The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each
other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual
and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all force
offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion,
sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever.
Id. at art. III.
Id. art. VIII, para. 2.
See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Articles of Confederation as a Source for
Determining the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 397, 401–
173
174

175
176
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As a result, the United States Constitution was written and divided the
country’s power between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
Article I details the powers of the legislative branch, Article II the executive
branch, and Article III the judicial branch. The branches are framed in a
way so they are accountable to each other, and each branch depends on the
people—the true source of authority. 177 Madison argues that the challenge in
running a government is enabling the government to control the governed
and then enabling it to control itself. 178 The government is able to control
itself through the separation of powers because not one government entity
will wield enough power to overstep its bounds. Madison writes that in the
federal republic of the United States “. . . all authority in it will be derived
from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so
many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or
of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the
majority.” 179 This type of government functions when the separation of
powers aims to protect the justice of its citizens, because “[i]n a society under
the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the
weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where
the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger.” 180
The constitution was written to give power to the people by limiting
the power of the government. To keep a particular branch of the
government going beyond its power enumerated by the constitution, the
other branches may provide accountability or a system of checks and
03 (2017) (“Although the Articles of Confederation did not remain in effect for a long period,
experience under the Articles paved the way for creating the far more enduring Constitution
. . . . [T]he influence of the Articles of Confederation remains discernable to this day.”).
Madison writes:
The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of
the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself,
but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external
nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty
lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and
in the next place oblige it to control itself.
A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
177

178
179
180

Id.
Id.
Id.
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balances. 181 For example, the president has the ability to veto laws made by
Congress in order to keep the legislative branch in check. 182 However,
Congress can override the president’s veto with a two-thirds vote from the
House of Representatives, which balances out the president’s power. 183 This
type of accountability is particularly difficult, however, when the branch is
statutorily authorized to act in a way that should be addressed by a different
branch.
As discussed above, under the Code of Federal Regulation, the
Attorney General of the United States appoints immigration judges “to
conduct specified classes of proceedings . . . [and] act as the Attorney
General’s delegates in the cases that come before them.” 184 “[I]mmigration
judges shall exercise the powers and duties delegated to them by the Act
and by the Attorney General through regulation.” 185 As the regulations state,
immigration judges are subject to the authority of the Attorney General
when deciding cases. These regulations give the executive branch an
advantage regarding power and, as a result, strip necessary powers from what
should be the judicial or legislative branch. The cases cited in Section IV
provide instances when the executive branch overstepped its bounds and,
ultimately, stripped justice from the parties involved. 186 This section analyzes
how and why this power wielded by the executive branch is unconstitutional.

B.

Powers of the Executive Branch

The executive branch holds both enumerated and implied
constitutional powers. Article II of the Constitution explicitly lists the
powers of the President including appointing him or her “Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,” 187 and “Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . and . . .
shall appoint Ambassadors.” 188 In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding an act of congress unconstitutional);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (limiting the power of the
President to seize private property).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
181

182
183

Id.

184

8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a) (2009).

185

Id. at (b).
See Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I.

186

& N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018); Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018); Matter of
A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

187
188

Id.
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Corp., the Supreme Court interprets the constitutional language to
determine that the President has broad authority to control foreign affairs. 189
It seems immigration issues fall directly under the category of foreign
affairs and, therefore, the executive branch seemingly has direct power over
immigration. However, the legislative branch has a similar argument. Article
I of the Constitution authorizes congress “[t]o establish a uniform rule of
naturalization,” 190 “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations,” 191 “[t]o
declare war,” 192 and prohibit “[t]he migration or importation of such persons
as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit.” 193 The
Constitution, therefore, establishes immigration power in both political
branches of the United States government.
Despite the executive branch’s constitutional powers over immigration,
the President has historically exercised restraint when dealing with
adjudication. 194 In her law review article, Professor Marouf argues that
presidential interference in proceedings leads to problems in administrative
adjudication. 195 Before she assumed her duties as an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, Elena Kagan emphasized this point by
distinguishing that procedural requirements are stricter when an agency acts
through adjudication rather than the rulemaking process. 196 She argues that
participation in adjudicative proceedings belongs to the affected parties to
“ensure[] fundamental fairness and protection against abuse,” and “[i]n this
context, presidential participation in administration, of whatever form,
would contravene procedural norms and inject an inappropriate influence
into the resolution of controversies.” 197

189

190
191
192
193
194

Quoting Justice Sutherland:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with
such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be
exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
Marouf, supra note 104, at 723.

195

Id.

196

Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2362 (2001).
Id. at 2362–63.

197
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This argument should also be applied to immigration cases. Indeed,
as seen in the cases discussed in Section IV, 198 President Trump’s
involvement and policy goals served (and continue to serve) as an
“inappropriate influence” in resolving immigration proceedings. 199 This
influence in no way promotes the goals of adjudication, and the judiciary is
beginning to fight back against these injustices.

C.

Relevant Case Law
1.

Romero v. Barr

200

Prior to the ruling in Romero v. Barr in August 2019, an immigration
judge denied the administrative closure 201 of Jesus Zuniga Romero’s original
case. 202 Romero, a Honduran citizen, petitioned the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) for review, but eventually the appeal was dismissed due to
the precedential decision of Matter of Castro-Tum. 203 In Castro-Tum,
See Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I.
& N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018); Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018); Matter of
A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
Kagan, supra note 195, at 2362.
Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019).
If not for the denial, Romero’s case would have been removed from the immigration
judge’s docket, which seemingly, was the intent of the attorney general. Id. at 286.
In 2013, “the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against
Romero” for being in the United States illegally. Id. at 286. Romero accepted a grant of
voluntary departure but eventually reopened the case because the immigration judge
determined he “was a beneficiary of a pending Form I-130 filed by his wife, who was then a
lawful permanent resident (“LPR”).” Id. Judge G. Steven Agee describes the ensuing events
in the proceeding:
After the I-130 had been approved, Romero filed a motion for administrative
closure, advising that his wife had since become a naturalized U.S. citizen and
that he wished to file a Form I-601A for a provisional unlawful presence waiver.
In order to file the Form, the removal proceedings had to be administratively
closed . . . . [A]dministrative closure is a procedural mechanism primarily
employed for the convenience of the adjudicator (namely, IJs and the BIA) in
order to allow cases to be removed from the active dockets of immigration
courts, often so that individuals can pursue alternate immigration remedies—
such as, in Romero’s case, pursuing a provisional unlawful presence waiver.
Romero advised that if his case were administratively closed, then once the
waiver had been approved, he intended to move to re-calendar and terminate
removal proceedings so that he could then go through the consular process in
Honduras.
Id. at 286–87 (quoting Judge G. Steven Agee).
Initially, the BIA granted Romero’s appeal and administratively closed the case; however,
this decision was dismissed later due to the decision in Matter of Castro-Tum. Id. (citing
Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018)).
198

199
200
201

202

203
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discussed in detail in Section IV, the Attorney General ruled that
immigration judges and the BIA do not have authority to administratively
close cases. 204
Romero’s wife became a naturalized United States citizen, and in
order for Romero to gain legal access into the country, he needed the
removal proceedings to be administratively closed. 205 But for the Attorney
General’s interference in Matter of Castro-Tum, Romero would have
successfully administratively closed his removal proceedings case and
would, therefore, have received legal access in the United States. Once
again, immigration judges are being stripped of their powers as adjudicators
to try cases on the merits rather than by influence (or interference) of the
executive branch.
Romero petitioned the BIA decision for review with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 206 Ultimately, the court
rejected the Attorney General’s ruling that immigration judges do not have
authority to administratively close cases. 207 This argument derives from his
interpretation of specific federal regulations outlining the powers and duties
of the BIA and immigration judges. 208 According to Attorney General
Quoting the Attorney General’s ruling:
Immigration judges and the Board have come to rely upon administrative
closure without thoroughly explaining their authority to do so. Unlike the power
to grant continuances, which the regulations expressly confer, immigration
judges and the Board lack a general authority to grant administrative closure.
No Attorney General has delegated such broad authority, and legal or policy
arguments do not justify it. I therefore hold that immigration judges and the
Board lack this authority except where a previous regulation or settlement
agreement has expressly conferred it.
Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 281.
Romero, 937 F.3d at 286.
Id. at 287. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2019):
A petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance
with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an
order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this Act. . .
Romero, 937 F.3d at 292.
The relevant regulations specifying the powers and duties of the BIA and immigration
judges are quoted below:
(b) Powers and duties. In conducting hearings under section 240 of the Act and
such other proceedings the Attorney General may assign to them, immigration
judges shall exercise the powers and duties delegated to them by the Act and by
the Attorney General through regulation. In deciding the individual cases before
them, and subject to the applicable governing standards, immigration judges
shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion and may take any
action consistent with their authorities under the Act and regulations that is
appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases. Immigration judges
shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross204

205
206

207
208
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Sessions, “. . . neither section . . . confers the authority to grant
administrative closure. Grants of general authority to take measures
‘appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases’ would not
ordinarily include the authority to suspend such cases indefinitely.” 209
The Fourth Circuit disagrees with this contention. 210 The court
comes to the conclusion that the plain language of the federal regulations “.
. . unambiguously confers upon [immigration judges] and the BIA the
general authority to administratively close cases. . .”—the exact opposite
interpretation of the Attorney General. 211 The court uses the standard tools
of interpretation to discern the text of the regulations—specifically focusing
on how both regulations grant immigration judges and the BIA the power
to “take any action . . . appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the
case.” 212 The court criticizes the Attorney General’s decision to disallow
immigration judges and the BIA to employ administrative closures—a
mechanism that has been used and consistently reaffirmed since the late
1980s. 213 Judge Agee argues that “. . . numerous petitioners have relied on
this long-established procedural mechanism to proceed through the
examine aliens and any witnesses. Subject to §§ 1003.35 and 1287.4 of this
chapter, they may issue administrative subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses
and the presentation of evidence. In all cases, immigration judges shall seek to
resolve the questions before them in a timely and impartial manner consistent
with the Act and regulations.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2019).
(d) Powers of the Board—(1) Generally. The Board shall function as an appellate
body charged with the review of those administrative adjudications under the
Act that the Attorney General may by regulation assign to it. The Board shall
resolve the questions before it in a manner that is timely, impartial, and
consistent with the Act and regulations. In addition, the Board, through
precedent decisions, shall provide clear and uniform guidance to the Service,
the immigration judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and
administration of the Act and its implementing regulations.
(ii) Subject to these governing standards, Board members shall exercise their
independent judgment and discretion in considering and determining the cases
coming before the Board, and a panel or Board member to whom a case is
assigned may take any action consistent with their authorities under the Act and
the regulations as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the case.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(d)(1)(ii).
Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 284. Attorney General Sessions further contends
that the provisions set out in the federal regulations “direct immigration judges or the Board
to resolve matters ‘in a timely fashion’—another requirement that conflicts with a general
suspension of authority.” Id.
Romero, 937 F.3d at 292.
209

210
211
212
213

Id.
Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b), 1003.1(d)(1)(ii)).
Id. at 296.
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immigration process. To suddenly change this interpretation of the
regulation undermines the significant reliance interests such petitioners have
developed.” 214
The Castro-Tum decision being vacated by Romero v. Barr brings
three major points to light. 215 First, the decision manifests the already
obvious efforts of the executive branch to fulfill its immigration policy goals
by stripping power from immigration judges. It has been apparent that
President Donald Trump wants to use the immigration courts as a means
of enforcing and increasing deportation. 216 The unprecedented interference
of the Attorney General in a case stripping the power of immigration judges
to administratively close cases is a clear abuse of power and an obvious
attempt to halt the just proceedings of Romero.
Second, the fact that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit vacated the decision by the Attorney General provides support that
the Attorney General was overstepping his bounds. The court calls the
decision in Castro-Tum “internally inconsistent” and holds that federal
regulations “unambiguously confer upon [immigration judges] and the BIA
the general authority to administratively close cases . . . .” 217 It is a relief that
the federal courts stepped in to vacate a decision that was clearly not ruled
on the merits of the case in an attempt to provide due process. In this
instance, the federal courts also kept the Attorney General in check in order
to avoid injustice.
Third, Romeo v. Barr emphasizes the need for immigration judges
to become their own independent court. If this were already the case—with
no pressure from the executive branch—the immigration courts would have
ruled in the same way as the federal courts. In Castro-Tum, the immigration
judge administratively closed the case in order to ensure the address for the
respondent was correct so that the Notice to Appear was being sent to the
right place. 218 However, as discussed above, Sessions appointed himself to
214
215

Id.
Id. at 286.

The Southern Poverty Law Center describes this type of power as a weapon that:
. . . has taken many forms, including the recasting of judges as enforcement
officers; the encouragement of bias against asylum seekers and their counsel;
the imposition of case quotas, which destroy impartiality by threatening judges’
job security; the politicization of immigration judge hiring and firing; and the
aggressive use of the certification power to eliminate important docket
management tools and encourage the prejudgment of cases.
The Attorney General’s Judges, supra note 50, at 18.
Romero, 937 F.3d at 294–97.
After the respondent failed to appear to five hearings, the immigration judge stated that he
did not view the “addresses as reliable and would not proceed . . .” and administratively
closed the case. Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 279 (A.G. 2018).
216

217
218
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the case and reversed years of precedent allowing immigration judges to
administratively close cases. 219 But for the Attorney General’s interference,
the case would have proceeded with the administrative closure. Given the
ruling in Romeo v. Barr, Castro-Tum should have proceeded with the
administrative closure because the decision gives this general authority back
to immigration judges. 220 If immigration judges were in their own
independent court, it would have saved the court’s time and resources in
ruling on a decision that was already made. In this case, the Attorney
General complicated the matter. No longer should the Attorney General
use immigration judges as tools for enforcing deportation—they should
simply be independent adjudicators.
VI. THE NEED FOR THE IMMIGRATION JUDICIARY’S INDEPENDENCE

A.

Why the Need for Separation?

It has come to the breaking point. The immigration court system is
no longer a place where cases can be adjudicated in a way that is consistent
with the Constitution. 221 Immigrants are no longer receiving their procedural
due process rights as laid out in the Constitution and as a result, immigrants
seeking asylum are suffering at the hands of the President. The Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution extends due process rights to
all people within the United States jurisdiction by stating that “[n]o person
shall be . . . without due process of law . . . .” 222 It may be obvious, but in
order for asylum to be granted, one must first appear in court. But without
their constitutional due process rights, asylum seekers will be turned away
Id. at 271.
Id. at 292.
See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”); see also

219
220
221

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all
‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). It is also relevant to quote, in full, the Fifth
Amendment:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
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only to return to the suffering that forced them to leave their country of
origin in the first place.
In an article written by Julia Preston, Jeremey McKinney, vicepresident of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, is quoted
saying “[i]t’s time for the Department of Justice and the immigration courts
to get a divorce.” 223 In July, the immigration lawyers joined with the
American Bar Association, the Federal Bar Association, and the National
Association of Immigration Judges in writing a letter to Congress asking to
be “establish[ed] as an independent court system that can guarantee a fair
day in court.” 224 The article notes that this idea was percolating in the
Democratic presidential contests, with three former candidates—Julián
Castro, Beto O’Rourke, and Senator Elizabeth Warren—presenting specific
plans. Another former candidate, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, drafted a bill
last year to make the change.” 225
This notion has support and is within reach as long as Congress still
considers it. Resolving the immigration courts crisis would bring the balance
of power back to the branches of the government. Immigration judges
would no longer adhere to the desires of the President; no longer would
they have to meet a specific quota of finishing cases in order to keep their
jobs. 226 They would simply rule on the merits of the case.

Julia Preston, Is It Time to Remove Immigration Courts From Presidential Control?, THE
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(Aug.
9,
2019,
6:00
AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/08/28/is-it-time-to-remove-immigration-courtsfrom-presidential-control [https://perma.cc/L9UM-QTVJ].
Id. The proposal would allow “the immigration courts [to] become a stand-alone agency
that would not be run or controlled by outside officials, with the goal of insulating judges
from political pressure by any administration.” Id.
Id. Preston’s article also notes that chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Rep.
Jerrold Nadler, a Democrat from New York, indicated that he will eventually be holding
hearings on the proposals. Id.
Id. One major cause of disruption among immigration judges was the need to fulfill a quota
of cases in order to expedite removal proceedings. Since October 2018, judges were required
to complete 700 cases a year with no more than fifteen percent of decisions being remanded
by appeals courts. In addition, time restrictions were set in place for some decisions. “To
remind judges of their standing, Justice officials designed a speedometer that sits on judges’
computer screens, with green marking numbers of decisions that meet the metrics and
stoplight red indicating where they are lagging.” Id.
Denise Noonan Slavin, a retired immigration judge, recalled seeing the dashboard: “So you
sit down and you see that dashboard staring at you, updated every day, and you have 50
motions on your desk to decide whether to continue a case. If judges get into that red, they
can lose their job.” Id.
223
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How Separation Would Work

This note mostly explores the reasons why the immigration courts
need independence from the executive branch and the Attorney General,
but it is important to outline how (if it all) this would be possible. Preston’s
article indicates that “[m]ost proposals to reconfigure the courts would have
Congress act under Article I of the Constitution.” 227 The United States
federal courts include the courts under Article III of the Constitution, and
the adjudicative entities established by Congress under its Article I legislative
powers. 228 Congress has created several of these Article I courts using its
Constitutional power, like tax and bankruptcy courts. 229 The Federal Bar
Association has drafted proposed legislation to create such a court, because
there is a consensus that the immigration court system is broken. 230 It is up
to Congress whether it wants to reconfigure the immigration courts to
become an Article I court, and all anyone else can do is continue to make
Proposals to reconfigure the immigration courts as a separate agency still within the
executive branch have been compared to the tax court that was set up in 1969 “to have
independent judges deciding federal tax disputes, taking them out of the grip of the Internal
Revenue Service.” Id.
The type of bill would be “drafted ‘with the idea of simply lifting the courts,’ and their budget,
out of the Justice Department, said Elizabeth Stevens, chair of the organization’s immigration
law section. Under this plan, the courts would remain in existing facilities and current judges
would continue to serve for four years before being re-appointed by Senate-confirmed
appeals judges to serve in the new system.” Id.
Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, supra note 2.
The adjudicative entities established by Congress are authorized under Article I of the
Constitution: “To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 9.
The Federal Judicial Center distinguishes between Article I and Article III judges:
Operating under its Article I, section 8 power to “constitute” federal tribunals,
Congress has created several courts staffed by judges holding these protections
who exercise the “judicial power” contemplated in Article III. These courts are
commonly known as “Article III” or “constitutional” courts. The latter moniker
can be confusing, as the Constitution does not oblige Congress to create any
particular court and such courts routinely hear non-constitutional disputes.
....
Since the earliest days of the republic, Congress has also created separate
“Article I” or “legislative” courts. Again, the nomenclature can be confusing as
Article I does not specifically authorize these courts and they do not “legislate”
in any traditional sense of the word. These courts range from independent
federal tribunals staffed with judges who are not subject to the tenure and salary
protection of Article III . . . . Unlike other Article I judges (including
bankruptcy, territorial and magistrate judges), for example, they are not
administered by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts or
governed by the Judicial Conference of the United States.
Courts: A Brief Overview, supra note 1.
Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, supra note 2.
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Congress aware of the injustices that immigration parties endure under the
authority of the executive branch.
VII. CONCLUSION
Injustice resides in the immigration courts. The executive branch
continues to turn their backs on asylum seekers and their families, causing
them to return to unsafe country conditions. Aliens seek asylum because
they are in danger. For some, entering the country illegally may be their only
option, but that does not mean a country should turn them away. The
United States was founded on inclusion and diversity and a way to flee a
tyrannical environment that had become oppressing and, in some cases,
dangerous. The framers of the Constitution created due process for a
reason, and it belongs to everyone.
The executive branch should no longer be in control of the
immigration courts because it has abused its power for too long. This was
painfully apparent during former Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ attempt at
reviewing cases he simply assigned to himself. This type of power does not
promote justice, due process, or democracy. President Trump is able to
force his political agenda on immigration judges in order to receive
decisions that are satisfactory to him. A court that has become politicized is
no court at all.
Congress needs to create legislation to make the immigration courts
an Article I court. The court would be overseen by judges themselves and
would eliminate the interference of the Attorney General and the President.
Due process would be restored and, so too, would the immigration judiciary
system.
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